The cease-fire in eastern Ukraine - this is good news for the long-suffering of the local population, but the truce remains extremely unstable and generates different expectations as both sides of the conflict, and of the forces that support them from abroad.

As for the West, the first obvious point is that, although the crisis in Ukraine has significantly increased hostility towards Russia, this hostility began to emerge a few years ago, and it was caused by the growing impression that Russia under President Vladimir Putin refuses to act accordance with what the world order that was established after the Cold War. Russian opposition to plan the United States air strike on the Assad regime in Syria, strong opposition to NATO expansion and deployment of missile defense elements in Europe, restrictions against subsidized Western foundations of non-governmental organizations in Russia and the lack of interest in the construction of Western-style democracy have served, perhaps, the last signal to Washington and Brussels that Putin's Russia is very different from other post-Soviet countries. From this perspective, Russia stubbornly refused to adopt Western standards of behavior strongly in all aspects.

Would be an exaggeration to say that the West was just looking for an opportunity to punish Russia. But still, of course, there was a predisposition to see the conflict between Moscow and Kiev Russia does not obey the aggressor and the victim of friendly Ukraine. This predisposition was the prism through which the actions of Russia in Ukraine perceived not only governments of the USA and the EU countries, but the majority of the Western media and the foreign policy elite, and broad public opinion.

The second point is that the position of a special relationship between Russia and Ukraine, and especially the recognition of the fact that by virtue of these relations Russia has in this state some special rights - widely rejected in the West and, in particular, in the United States. The neo-conservatives and liberal interventionists, which largely determined America's foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, boasted that it was the course of America led to the defeat of the Soviet Union. Pragmatic realists opposed the exaggeration of the role the United States in the collapse of the Soviet Union and was reminded that in August 1991, President George HW Bush warned against nationalism in Ukraine and elsewhere in the Soviet Union, obviously preferring a scenario in which Ukraine would remain in a reformed Soviet Union. From this perspective, Yeltsin's Russia, which declared the support of the overwhelming majority in the parliament of the sovereignty of the RSFSR, much more than the United States, is responsible for the launch of the chain of events that led to the collapse of the USSR. It was President Yeltsin called Russian soldiers not to obey the orders of the Soviet leadership in conflict with the Baltic separatists. And, of course, it was Yeltsin signed an agreement with Ukraine and Belarus, by driving the last nail in the coffin of the Soviet state.

Despite this, the neoconservatives and realists agree that Ukraine today is a sovereign state, and like any other state, it has the right to defend its territorial integrity. In the West, saying that since the end of World War II, part of a European state was annexed by another state. From a technical point of view, it is. Kosovo was forcibly torn away from Yugoslavia and is included in the European orbit with the potential prospect of acquiring the status of a member of NATO, but it did not become part of Albania. Is there any difference in terms of geopolitics between annexation and that kind of rejection - the question is more complicated. But this very distinction has allowed Washington and Brussels to argue that their position is morally superior.

The fact that the United States and its allies have carried out an open invasion of a number of States in the last two decades, is not regarded as a precedent. Similarly, the fact that the Obama administration has provided assistance to the Syrian rebels and planned to launch air strikes against the Assad regime in the face of increasingly distinct opposition to these plans in Congress, is not regarded as a relevant analogue towards Ukraine. Some may say that there is a big difference between opposition to the Syrian dictator and support the Western-oriented in the direction of democracy, the Ukrainian government. Others, like many in Moscow, will point out the hypocrisy and double standards. Historian, perhaps indicate that Rome considered permissible for a fact that could never have countenanced for Parthia, and that States rarely require their allies subject to the same standards of conduct, and that of their rivals. Whatever it was, but by the time the majority of Russian Ukrainian crisis in the West is no longer perceived as a partner, if not as an enemy.

The third point: I must say that the idea that the United States was forced to reluctantly forced to obey them Europe enter into conflict with Russia is an obvious simplification. Of course, some pressure from America to introduce more and more severe sanctions was obvious, but many in Europe welcomed the pressure and really want even more stringent steps than those that undertook the Obama administration. Poland and the Baltic states were asked to permanent placement NATO infrastructure on its territory. Sweden essentially acts in the same way. The major European powers, for which the expansion of the European Union served as the main justification for their own legitimacy, were not prepared to resist such calls for solidarity. Angela Merkel, being more utilitarian than most of the other leaders, is hardly a friend of Russia and was not interested in the fact that the enemy brought the Baltic and Polish appeals to resist Moscow. Simple question: What kind of Ukraine would have preferred to see Germany - pro-Western or in alliance with Russia, which would once again turn Russia into a European superpower. The answer is self-evident.

From this perspective, the introduction of new sanctions against Russia after the Minsk agreement has a certain logic. After all, this agreement - the result of not only Putin's peace plan, but also a counter insurgency that Moscow openly supported. Russian idea was not to let the crush Kiev Donetsk and Lugansk republic, the idea of Brussels and Washington - to emphasize that for greater involvement in the situation in Ukraine, Russia will have to pay a heavy price.

Accordingly, as soon as the cease-fire in eastern Ukraine was established, it became obvious that there are irreconcilable differences not only in the interests of the parties to the conflict, but even in the description of what actually happened in the Ukraine and around it. Of this situation, there is no easy way out, but there are very powerful reasons to avoid escalation of the conflict.

I do not believe that sanctions may force Russia to fundamentally change its policies. Just not a single example where sanctions would make an independent country, and the more a great power, to abandon what it considers consistent with its key interests. But, on the other hand, I find it hard to imagine that Russia would like to capture the eastern Ukraine and especially the whole of Ukraine. I admit that this option is feasible from a military standpoint and emotionally engaging. However, even without sanctions implementation of such a scenario would require Russia is very serious economic sacrifices. It would make Ukraine an important factor in Russian politics (and Western policy towards Russia) for many years ahead.

In a situation where there is no good way out, usually looking for short-term solutions. However, although the option of creating a new frozen conflict looks better than war, in the long run it will not satisfy anyone. Lasting solution to the Ukrainian question is a more ambitious and difficult task, however only when all the cards are laid on the table, it will be possible, in principle, to achieve a sustainable agreement that would take into account the minimum program of all parties to the conflict. It would include ensuring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, guarantee genuine autonomy for the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, the establishment of non-aligned status of Ukraine and for the lifting of sanctions.

Ukrainian nationalists and many militias may not want to such a decision, but it is, in principle, would be acceptable to Moscow, Washington and Brussels. But the devil is in the details. In the West, many sought a formula that would clearly demonstrate that Russia - the losing party and Putin gained nothing from the fact that they represent aggression. However, as shown by incorporation of the Crimea, attempts to drive a great power in the corner - a dangerous occupation. Moscow understands that under the economic sanctions it is difficult to compete with the United States and the EU. But a new front for the United States in Syria and Iraq recalled that Russia has the options of painful asymmetric responses, and not only in the Middle East. In no one's interests to continue to check each other for strength.

Author: Dimitri Simes, a political scientist

Теги: Novorossiya

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